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IN THE SUP1:ETl1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UT/1H, 
Plaintiff- Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 15560 
ARVIL ll. HARRIS, 
Defen cl ant-A pp ell ant. 
BRIEF OF J~PPELLANT 
Appeal from sentence and order denying appellant's 
motion for order allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty and 
enter plea of not guilty; motion to arrest judgment; motion for new 
trial; motion to reconsider sentence and for hearing in which to 
present evidence in mitigation; motion to review presentence re-
port, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Third District Court Judge 
presiding. 
ROBERT B. HJ\NSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
ROBERT L. LORD 
118 Metropolitan Law Building 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE SUPHEIVlE COUHT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTJ\ll, 
Plain tiff-He sponden t, 
vs. 
ARVIL A. HAHRIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15560 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATUHE OF THE CASE 
In its simplest form, defendant seeks an order from 
this court allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty and to enter a 
plea of not guilty. In the alternative, defendant seeks an order vacat-
ing the sentence imposed by the Salt Lake County Court, remanding 
to the district court for resentencing with instructions to allow him 
to present evidence in mitigation and to review the presentence report. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant was arraigned before the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County and entered a plea of guilty to attempting 
to receive stolen property, a class A misdemeanor. Defendant requested 
a presentence investigation which request was referred by the court. There-
after, and after the court had received and reviewed the presentence report, 
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appellant came before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor for sentencing. 
He was sentenced to the maximum allowed by law, i.e., $1, 000. 00 
fine and one year in the Salt LaJ:e County Jail, and committed forth-
with. 
Defendant thereafter duly filed a motion seeking an order 
allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a not guilty plea; 
asking that the judgment be arrested, the sentence suspended, and the 
defendant discharged; requesting a new trial; and seeking to examine 
and review the presentcnce report and to have an opportunity to explain 
or rebut the derrogatory allegations which he believed were contained 
therein. All motions were denied by the court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON .l°\PPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this court allowing him to wifr.-
draw his guilty plea, substitute a not guilty plea, and proceed to trial. 
In the alternative, he seeks an order vacz.ting the sentence imposed by 
Judge G. Hal Taylor and remanding to the district court for resentencing 
with instructions to allow defendant to present evidence in imtigation and 
to examine and review the presentence report. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was originally charged with receiving stolen 
property, a third degree felony. After the complaint was amended 
to charge attempting to receive stolen property, defendant wuivecJ pre-
liminary hearing in the Salt Lake City Court and was bound over to the 
-2-
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District Court for trial. To the charge contained in the information 
(R. 8, 0), defendant pleaded guilty dlld asked for a presentence investi-
gation 311d report. (R. 48-52). Approximately four weeks later, he 
appeared before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor for sentencing. (R. 41-45). 
The Court thereupon sentenced defendant to the maximum allowed by law 
and committed him immediately to the Salt Lake County jail. Defendant, 
within 10 days filed a motion for a new trial (R. 15-20), together with 
supporting affidavits (R. 21-26), which motion was consolidated with 
various other motions, the most important of which were his motions to 
withdraw his guilty plea, and his motion to see the presentence report and 
to be allowed to explain or rebut the allegations contained therein. (R. 15 -
20). These motions were denied (R. 27). Appellant thereafter filed his 
notice of appeal (R. 28, 29), designated the record (R. 21, 29, 40), and 
otherwise perfected his appeal. 
Defendant maintains that his guilty plea was entered upon 
the expectation that he would be treated as other first offenders involving 
only offense against property, and that had he been so treated, he would 
have received only a fine and jail sentence with the jail sentence suspended 
and he would have been placed on probation. (R. 17, 18). Based upon 
the remarks of Judge Taylor at the time of sentencing (R. 44, lines 2 
through 12), and other remarks made off the record to defendant's counsel, 
defendant contends that the presentence report contained derrogatory infor-
-3-
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mation to the effect that he was continuously involved in the fencing 
business and that he had made threats to do bodily harm to the state 10 
wi:.ness, and he should be allowed access to the information conhincd 
in the presentence report and given an opportunity to explain or rebut 
such allegations. (See Motion for New Trial, etc., R. 15-20, and 
particularly the affidavit in support thereof, R. 24-26.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED \VHEN IT l~CCEPTED DEFEND1\N'S 
PLEA OF GUILTY \VITHOUT MAKING A DETER!\HNATION THAT 
THERE WERE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO \V _A.RRANT A FINDING OF 
GUILTY 
The trial court adequately det".:"!rmined that the defendant 
was entering a voluntary plea and that he understood the consequences. 
It uiierly failed, however, to determine if there were facts sufficient 
to warrant the acceptance of a guilty plea as required by the principles 
enunciated in the case of State vs. Forsythe (Utah, 1977), 560 P. 2d. 337 
(R. 48-52). In the Forsythe case the defendant had been charged with 
numerous counts of theft by deception. Pursuant to a plea bargain he 
pleaded guilty to one charge and all the rest were dismissed upon motion 
of the prosecutor. Before accepting the plea, however, the Court heard 
a summary from the prosecutor and from tch defense counsel of their 
evidence and their respective positions, and based upon such summaries, 
accepted the plea. Apparently a prescnience report was requested, altholl,' , 
there is no mention of such in the opinion. (Defendant pleaded guilty on 
_,1 _ 
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January 30, HJ7G, and appeared for sentencing on February 27, 1976). 
At the time of sentencing Forsythe moved to withdraw his plea of guilty 
and to enter a plea of not guilty. Whether this motion came before or 
after the court had pronounced sentence is unclear. In any event the 
sentencing court refused to allow the withdrawl of the plea. 
Defendant thereupon appealed to this court asserting two 
grounds for relief, i. c. , (a) that his plea had not been freely given, 
and the (b) the trial court did not sufficiently ascertain whether there 
was sufficient factual basis to justify accepting his guilty plc a. Justice 
Crockett, speaking for the court at page 339 of the Pacific Reporter 
made the following observation: 
'\Ve recognize, of course, that it is the duty of the 
trial court to see that the interests of justice are served 
by not allowing a person to enter a plea of guilty to a crime 
he has not committed. In performing that duty, the court 
is not bound to any rigidity of rule or procedure, but may 
do it in any manner consistent with reason and fairness 
which he thinks will best accomplish that purpose. This 
responsibility was properlv t:1ken care of here by theco;rt 
ficanng a :oumman' by the prosecutor and by the defendant's 
counsel of thL'tr cnclcncc as to the positi.on of each, upon the 
basis of \':lHch the court accepted the plea of guilty on the one 
count and grantc:cl the motion to dismiss to the others. (Emphasis 
added) 
Unlike the Forsythe case, the trial court in the instant case 
made no inquiry into any factual matt2rs constituting the alleged offense, 
either at the time of arraignment (R. 48-52), or at the time of sentencing. 
(R. 41-45). In fact, the allegations contained on pages 2 and 3 of the 
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defendant's motion for new trial (R. 16, 17) raise the presumption 
that there was a legitimate defense and hence no factual basis for 
accepting the guilty plea. Because there arc no facts at all upon 
which to sustain a determination of guilty established in the record, 
defendant should be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter 
a not guilty plea as requested in his motion for new trial (R. 15, 
paragraph numbered 1). 
POINT II 
RELIANCE UPON THE PRESENTENCE REPORT AND 
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EVEN ITS SUBSTANCE TO DEFENDANT 
CONSTITUTES REVERSABLE ERROR 
I 
With ever increasing frequency the sanctity of the secret 
presentence report is being challenged by defendants at all levels of 
the state and federal systems. Traditionally the courts have held 
that the sentencing judge was allowed wide discretion as to the infor-
mation and the source thereof to be considered by him at the time of 
sentencing. In addition, he was not ordinarily required to reveal to 
the defendant the information contained in any prcscntencc investigation 
commissioned by the court. Even so, such discretion was not without 
limits, and had to meet certain due process requirements. Sec, for 
example, United States vs. Espinoza (5th Cir. 1973), 481 F. 2d. 553, 
where the court held that "Despite broad discretion left to the trial 
-6-
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judge in assessing background information for sentencing purposes 
a defendant retains the right not to be sentenced on the basis of in-
vO.:id premises. " 
At the time of sentencing, the judge in the Espinoza case 
explicitly stated that he had information that Espinoza had been involved 
in various threats and assaults. Espinoza asked for an evidentiary 
hearing, or at least an opportunity to rebut the allegations which he 
contended were factually erroneous. The trial judge refused. On 
appeal the court reversed and sent the case hack for resentencing 
with instructions to allow defendant an opportunity to explain or rebut 
the allegations. Quoting from a 1965 United States Supreme Court case, 
Harris vs. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S. Ct. 352, 15 L. Ed. 2d. 240, 
the court said: 
"Fair administration of justice demands that the sentencing 
judge will not act on surmise, misinformation and suspicion, 
but will impose sentence with insight and understanding. " 
See also Townsend vs. Burke (1948), 334 U.S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 
1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690; United States vs. Battaglia (5th Cir. 1972), 478 F. 2d. 
854; United States vs. Weston (9th Cir. 1971), 448 F.2d .. 626; and United 
States vs. Malcolm (2nd Cir. 1970), 432 F. 2d. 809, all standing for the 
proposition that the trial judges discretion is not unlimited, that it must 
appear that he actually exercised his discretion intelligently and not 
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arbitrarily, and that where there is any dispute concerning the accurac· 
of the pre sentence report, defendant must be given an opportunity to 
re hut. 
Although defendant's counsel has developed information whic1, 
leads him to believe that the presentence report contains allegations that ~ 
defendant conspired to do bodily harm to the state's witness, defendant 
Harris does not have any certain knowledge that the presentence report 
was infected with inaccuracies, or even that it contained any derrogatory 
information. However, as is stated in his motion for new trial (R. 15-20 
at pages 17 and 18), considering the disposition of othe:c first offender 
cases, he had every reason to believe he would be given probation. The 
sentence is clearly unusual and out of line with that usually meted out 
to first offenders involving crimes against property only. Defendant 
moved the court for an opportunity to submit evidence in mitigation of 
the offense, and for an opportunity to examine the presentence report 
(R. 15, 16), which motions were denied by the court. Although it was 
not reported by the reporter, this writer, as counsel for the defendant, 
asked the court at the time of sentencing for some facts in justification 
of the sentence, but the judge refused, 
The present state of the record makes it clear that defendant 
should be afforded an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of the 
offense, and particularly should be made aware of at least the substance 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the dcrrogatory information in the prcscntcncc report and given an 
opportunity to offer evidence in rebuttal. Even more compelling than 
any of the above, however, is the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in the recent case of Gardner vs. Florida (March, 1977), 97 S. Ct. 
, 51 L. Ed. 2d. 393. In that case Gardner was convicted of first 
degree murder in a Florida court. After the required separate sentencing 
hearing, the jury recomendcd a life sentence on the ground that the miti-
gating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances. But the 
trial judge, relying in part on a presentence report that he had ordered, 
portions of which were not disclosed to or requested by counsel for either 
party, imposed the death sentence on the ground that aggravating cireum-
stances justified it and that there were no mitigating circumstances. Upon 
writ of certiorari the United States Supreme Court vacated the death sentence 
and remand~J to the Florida Supreme Court with directions to order further 
sentencing procce dings at the trial level. 
Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the court and 
expressed the view tho.t (1) the sentencing process, as well as the trial 
itself, must satisfy requirements of due process; (2) sentencing was a 
critical stage of a criminal proceeding at which the defendant was entitled 
to the effective assistance of counsel; (3) the defendant in the case was 
denied due process when the death penalty was imposed, in part, on the 
basis of confidential information which wo.s not disclosed to the defendant 
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or his counsel, and which the defendant thus had no opportunity to dc:ny 
or explain; (4) such procedure could not be justified as (a) being esscnti:l ! 
to enable investigators to obtain scnsi ti ve disclo surcs from pc rsons un-
willing to comment publicly about a defendant's background or character, 
(b) preventing delays which would result if full disclosure of the prcsenttr I 
report were required, (c) preventing disruption of the rehabilitation pre-
cess, or (d) being warranted by the trust to be put in 1 rial judges to exerc. 
their sentencing discretion in a responsible manner; (5) even if it were 
permissible to withhold a portion of the report from the defendant or 
his counsel, it would nevertheless be necessary to include the full repon 
in the record on appeal in order that the reviewing court could fulfill its 
duty of determining that sentencing procedures were administered with 
an even hand; (6) the failure of defense counsel to request access to the 
full report did not justify the submission of only a partial record to the 
reviewing court or constitute an effective waiver of the constitutional 
error in the record, and (7) thus the procedure employed by the Florida 
courts did not satisfy the constitutional command that no person shall he 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 
It is important to note that there was nothing in the record 
of the Gardner case to indicate that there was any thing derrogatory in 
the presentcncc report, and that the defendant's counsel did not ask to 
see the report prior to the sentencing. Even so, the Supreme Court J1,i, 
-10-
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that due process required that the defcnd;:int be given 8Il opportunity to 
explain or rc;but ::ind that he could not do so unless the presentence report 
were revealed to him. At the very least, it must be included in the record 
on appeal. 
11 
And then there is the statute law of the State of Utah itself. 
Section 77-35-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that where discretion 
is allowed the sentencing judge, he may take into account any aggravating 
or mitigating circumstances which may be presented by either party. 
Section 77-35-13 provides in relevant part as follows: 
"The circumstances must be presented by the testimony 
of witnesses examined in open court ... No affidavit or 
testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or written, 
shall be offered to or received by the court or a judge thereof 
in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment except as pro-
vided in this section. " (Emphasis added) 
The Utah court has not faced head on the constitutional 
questions involved in withholding information abtained in a presentence 
report, nor has it squarely faced the clear meaning of the foregoing 
statutory provision. In the case of State vs. Martin (1917), 164 P. 500, 
the sentencing judge had apparently prsided over another trial involving 
the same dcfcnd;:int. Based upon the knowledge which he had acquired at 
the previous trial, as well 8S information from the current trial, the judge 
imposed ::i rather severe sentence. Defen<l;:int contended that consideration 
of information obtained at the prior trial was a violation of the statute re-
-11-
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quiring testimony in open court, i.e. 77-35-12. The Utah court held iha: ! 
to vacate the sentence would be tantamolmt to inquiring into the mental 
attitude and mind of the judge. He could not be required to disregard 
what he obviously knew. In that respect, at least, the application of 
77-35-13 was never passed upon by the court. 
In 1969 the court again had an opportunity to decide the 
applicability of 77-35-13. Again it sidestepped the issue. In State vs. 
Cunico, 23 U. 2d. 325, 462 P. 2d. 720, Justice Tuckett, writing for the 
court held that where clemency had actually been extended to the defendo:c 
and he was placed on probation upon the condition that he serve one mon\r. 
in the county jail, there could not lx;any violation of the statute nor abuse 
of judicial discretion. 
In 1973, the case of State vs. Doremus was decided, 29 U. 2d. 
373, 510 P. 2d. 529 -- again on the basis that defendant had nothing to 
complain about since clemency had in fact been extended to the dcfendaJH. I 
And finally the case of Reddish vs. Smith, no. 15455, was 
decided March 1, 1978. One of the contentions of the appellant was that 
there were factual errors in the pre sentence report which came to his 
attention after judgment and committment to the Utah State Pcnetentiary. 
He filed a writ of habeas corpus which was summarily denied by the distr: 
court. The Supreme court denied his writ upon the ground that habeas 
corpus was not an appropriate remedy where the matter could have Lill'' 
-12-
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raised on appeal. Dicta in the case makes reference to the fact that 
no discretion was allowed the sentencing judge, and therefore, sections 
77-3S-12 and 13 did not come into play. The decision, however, simply 
dcciclcd that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy. 
If the statute is to mean anything, it must mean, at the very 
least, that defendants be given the substance of any presentence reports. 
If the plain meaning of the words is to be accorded them, it means that 
presentence reports ~t be utilized. The writer believes that a reason-
able interpretation would allow their use where both parties are in agreement 
and know the contents, otherwise they must be prohibited. It is interesting 
to note that this writer can find no authorization for a presentence report 
or investigation in the statutes. There are references to such, as in 
76-3-104, but nothing expressly authorizing, limiting, or otherwise 
defining the use of the traditional prcscntence report. Section 76-3-104 
expressly authorizes committment to prison for a 90 day evaluation and 
report, and defines the conditions and limits thereof. One of the conditions 
is that counsel for the prosecution and for the defendant be appraised of 
the results of the evaluation. The same conditions should be required for 
use of the tradi tion::il pre sentence report. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not carry out its responsibility to 
ddc-rminc that there were facts sufficient to justify accepting the 
-13-
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defendant's guilty plea. For that reason he should I.Jc allowed to withdraw 
the plea and enter a new plea of not guilty. In addition, the sentence is 
disproportionate to the severity of the offense, particularly so since it 
constitutes a first offense for appellant. 
The constitutional requirements of due process as outlined 
in the Gardner vs. Florida case absolutely prohibit the use of a secret 
presentence report, particularly where, as here, the defendant asks 
for an opportunity to consider the allegations of the report and to present 
evidence in rebuttal. And finally, the mandate of the Utah statute prohibits 
the use of any information developed by the court in the sentencing process 
unless that information is presented by testimony in open court. For all 
of the foregoing, and for each of them, the case should be remanded to the 
district court with instructions to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty 
plea and enter a plea of not guilty, or, in the alternative, the sentence 
should be vacated and the matter remanded with instructions to allow 
inspection of the presentence report and an opportunity to present evidence 
in rebuttal prior to resentencing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBEHT L."' LOHD 
Attorney for J\ppcllant 
l 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
